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JURISDICTION 
For the reasons stated below and for the reasons outlined in BV Jordanelle, LLC's 
("BV Jordanelle") Suggestion ofMootness filed with the Court on January 15, 2010, the 
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, and this appeal is moot. Should 
the Court disagree with BV Jordanelle's arguments regarding jurisdiction, this Court 
could review Judge Pullan's decision pursuant to its jurisdiction over final judgments and 
orders of the district courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal on the merits 
where The Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC ("The Highlands") failed to name in its 
Complaint or anywhere in the case below the beneficiary under the Trust Deed securing 
the property sought to be condemned, and where that interest was subsequently 
foreclosed and transferred to a third-party—BV Jordanelle—that was only added to the 
case after the entry of final judgment. 
2. Whether the underlying action was filed prematurely where The Highlands 
failed to provide PWJ Holdings, LLC ("PWJ"), the original landowner of the real 
property in question, with the name and telephone number of the property rights 
ombudsman prior to filing its Complaint and where the "public road" that The Highlands 
seeks to access by condemning private property for an easement has not even been 
constructed and may never be constructed. 
3. Whether the trial court properly denied The Highlands' motion for entry of 
default judgment and found that The Highlands, which is a private landowner, had not 
1 
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been expressly or impliedly authorized by the Legislature to use the power of eminent 
domain to condemn an easement from its private landowner neighbor, even though a 
portion of the eminent domain act provides that the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised on behalf of "roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use" and "by-roads 
leading from highways to residences and farms." 
Standard of Review: In reviewing an order denying a motion for entry of default 
judgment and dismissing a case, the Court of Appeals reviews the legal conclusions used 
to support the decision for correctness, and reviews findings of fact under a clear error 
standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
I. Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right. 
II. Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 22 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation. 
III. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29(3). 
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, 
without right of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, 
and claim of the trustor and the trustor's successors in interest and of all 
persons claiming by, through, or under them, in and to the property sold, 
including all right, title, interest, and claim and to the property acquired by 
the trustor or the trustor's successors in interest subsequent to the execution 
2 
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of the trust deed, which trustee's deed shall be considered effective and 
relate and relate back to the time of the sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501 (2008), a copy of which is attached to the 
Appellant's Brief as Addendum 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504 (2008). Conditions precedent to taking. 
(1) Before property can be taken it must appear that: 
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
(b) the taking is necessary for the use; 
(c) construction and use of all property sought to be condemned will 
commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after 
the initiation of proceeding under this party; and 
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to 
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
(2) (a) As used in this section, "governing body" means: t 
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the 
county, city, or town; and 
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person 
or body with authority to govern the affairs of the political 
subdivision. 
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state 
unless the governing body of the political subdivision approves the 
taking. 
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent 
domain action, the governing body of each political subdivision 
intending to take property shall provide written notice to each owner 
of property to be taken of each public meeting of the political 
subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking 
is expected to occur and allow the property owner the opportunity to 
be heard on the proposed taking. 
(d) The requirement under Subsection (2)(c) to provide notice to a 
property owner is satisfied by the governing body mailing the 
written notice to the property owner: 
(i) at the owner's address as shown on the records of the 
county assessor's office; and 
(ii) at least ten business days before the public meeting. 
3 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505. Negotiation and disclosure required 
before voting to approve an eminent domain action. 
Each person who seeks to acquire property by eminent domain or 
who intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property 
cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall: 
(1) before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain 
action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for 
the purchase of the property; and 
(2) as early in the negotiation process under Subsection (1) as 
practicable but no later than 14 days before a final vote is taken to approve 
the filing of an eminent domain action, unless the court for good cause 
allows a shorter period before filing: 
(a) advise the property owner of the owner's rights to mediation and 
arbitration under Section 78B-6-522, including the name and current 
telephone number of the property rights ombudsman, established in Title 
13, Chapter 43, Property Rights Ombudsman Act; and 
(b) provide the property owner a written statement explaining that oral 
representations or promises made during the negotiation process are not 
binding upon the person seeking to acquire the property by eminent 
domain. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507 (2009), Complaint - Contents. 
(1) The complaint shall contain: 
(b) the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if 
known, or a statement that they are unknown, who must be styled 
defendants; 
4 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This appeal is about whether a private, for profit real estate developer, The 
Highlands, can acquire a portion of its neighbor's real property by eminent domain, so 
that the developer can build a road to service its contemplated residential development. 
BV Jordanelle, which now owns the property sought to be condemned, was not a party to 
the underlying district court proceeding before Judge Pullan where this issue was first 
addressed. Moreover, PWJ, the prior owner of the property, chose not to defend itself in 
that action, and was defaulted. Notwithstanding that fact, Judge Pullan, in a detailed, 
thorough, and well-written decision, decided that The Highlands could not condemn BV 
Jordanelle's land because it had not been expressly or impliedly authorized by the Utah 
Legislature to exercise the power of eminent domain, and he dismissed the Highlands' 
Complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed, and BV Jordanelle was thereafter 
substituted in for PWJ as appellee. BV Jordanelle then filed a Suggestion of Mootness 
with the Court. The Court deferred a ruling on the mootness questions raised by BV 
Jordanelle, however, and directed the parties to brief the merits. The Suggestion of 
Mootness remains pending, as do the merits questions if jurisdiction is found. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant The Highlands is a private entity which owns a parcel of real 
property in Wasatch County, Utah (hereinafter the "Highlands Parcel") that it plans to 
develop as part of a residential development known as The Highlands at Jordanelle. (R. 
105-106.) 
5 
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2. Lying directly west of the Highlands Parcel is real property (hereinafter the 
"PWJ Parcel") formerly owned by original appellee PWJ. (R. 105.) 
3. The Highlands wants to connect its planned development on the Highlands 
Parcel to a proposed and platted road known as the Talisman Parkway by building a road 
over the neighboring PWJ Parcel. (R. 105.)1 
4. According to The Highlands, it initially sought to "secure" an easement for 
the desired road across the PWJ Parcel from PWJ, but PWJ refused to discuss the matter. 
(R. 104.) 
5. On September 5, 2008, The Highlands hand-delivered a letter to PWJ. The 
letter generally informed PWJ of its rights under section 78B-6-505 of the Utah Code. 
(R. 2, 104.) 
6. The letter did not, however, include the name and current telephone number 
of the property rights ombudsman, as required by section 78-6-505(2)(a) of the Utah 
Code. (R. 2, 104.) 
7. Thereafter, on September 23, 2008, The Highlands filed a complaint in the 
Utah Fourth Judicial District for Wasatch County, State of Utah, instituting this action 
(the "Complaint") and purported to state a cause of action for condemnation. (R. 103.) 
8. PWJ was the only defendant named by The Highlands in the Complaint as 
an owner or claimant of the property. (R. 24.) 
9. However, at the time the Highlands filed suit, the PWJ parcel was already 
1
 The "road" identified and described by The Highlands as the Talisman Parkway has not been constructed but is 
only considered an existing "road" by virtue of a plat being filed with the Wasatch County Recorder's Office, 
wherein the proposed "road" is identified. 
6 
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encumbered by a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents (the "Deed of Trust"), 
recorded on April 4, 2008, in favor of BV Lending, LLC (hereinafter "BV Lending"), an 
affiliate of BV Jordanelle, as beneficiary. (A true and correct copy of the Deed of Trust, 
which was recorded on April 4, 2008 (more than five months before the filing of the 
Complaint), as Entry No. 334115, in Book 0963, beginning on page 2246, in the official 
records of the Wasatch County Recorder, State of Utah, is attached to BV Jordanelle's 
Suggestion of Mootness ("Mootness Memo") as Exhibit "A.") 
10. The Deed of Trust was executed by PWJ, as trustor, for the benefit of BV 
Lending, as beneficiary, as security for two promissory notes made by PWJ to BV 
Lending in the original principal amounts of $2,116,402, and $4,232,804, respectively. 
(Mootness Memo, Ex. "A," page 1.) 
11. As the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, B V Lending had a recorded lien 
against the PWJ Parcel, and a clear interest in any condemnation proceeding involving 
the PWJ Parcel. {See R. 24.) 
12. BV Lending later assigned its interest as beneficiary of the Deed of Trust 
to BV Jordanelle, by an instrument dated October 29, 2009. (A true and correct copy of 
this Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached to the Mootness Memo as Exhibit "B.") 
13. PWJ did not appear to defend against the lawsuit filed by The Highlands, 
and on October 16, 2008, the clerk of the district court signed an Entry of Default in this 
matter against PWJ. (R. 35-36.) 
14. However, the district court judge, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, denied 
The Highlands' subsequent Motion for Entry of Default Judgment in a decision dated 
7 
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December 29, 2008, and thereafter dismissed the case with prejudice. (R. 91.) 
15. Judge Pullan reasoned that The Highlands, as a private limited liability 
company, had no authority under Utah law to file a condemnation action for the purpose 
of acquiring an easement for the desired road across the PWJ Parcel because it lacked the 
express or implied power of eminent domain. (Id.) 
16. The Highlands filed a notice of appeal on January 7, 2009. (R. 109). 
17. The relief requested by The Highlands on appeal is reversal of Judge 
Pullan's order of dismissal, and a remand back to Judge Pullan to enter a default 
judgment and "to determine a reasonable time for the Highland[s] to complete the 
dedication of the Easement as a public roadway." (Aplt's. Br. at 28.) 
18. On November 5, 2009, PWJ's entire fee simple interest in the PWJ Parcel 
was foreclosed out and eliminated by a Trustee's Deed and the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-29(3). The Trustee's Deed, which conveyed the PWJ Parcel to BV 
Jordanelle as the new fee simple owner, was recorded November 10, 2009, as Entry No. 
354092, in Book 1004, beginning on page 0187, in the official records of the Wasatch 
County Recorder, State of Utah. (A true and correct copy of the Trustee's Deed is 
attached to the Mootness Memo as Exhibit "C") 
19. On November 9, 2009, The Highlands moved to substitute BV Jordanelle 
as the appellee and real party in interest in this action in place of PWJ, citing the 
conveyance of the property to BV Jordanelle at the Trustee's Sale. (Aplt's Mot. for 
Substitution of Parties at 2.) 
20. No objection was made, and on December 3, 2009, this Court granted The 
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Highlands' motion for substitution. (A true and correct copy of the Order is attached to 
the Mootness Memo as Exhibit "D.") 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides in part that "[a]ll men have 
the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property . . .." The listing of one's property rights immediately after 
the right to defend one's life and liberty underscores the importance of these inherent and 
inalienable rights regarding property. Yet, in the face of these Constitutional rights, The 
Highlands, a private, for profit limited liability company, is seeking to condemn a portion 
of a neighboring private landowner's property so that it can increase the value of its own 
land. This Court should not allow that to happen. 
The Highlands falls far short in its brief of showing how the Eminent Domain Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58B-6-501 through 522, authorizes a private party to condemn 
property for the purpose of constructing a road to a residential development. But, before 
this Court addresses The Highlands' bold and unsupported theory regarding 
condemnation (and perhaps without even having to address that argument), Judge 
Pullan's decision should be affirmed for two initial and independent reasons. 
First, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal as a result of The 
Highlands' failure to initially name BV Lending as a defendant in the case below, and the 
subsequent foreclosure of the very property interest sought to be condemned. Because 
BV Lending's interest in the PWJ Parcel was recorded, The Highlands was on legal, 
record notice of BV Lending's security interest and its consequent legal obligation to 
9 
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name BV Lending as a defendant in the Complaint if it wanted to affect that interest in 
any way. And, upon the completion of the foreclosure of PWJ's interest and conveyance 
of the PWJ parcel to BV Jordanelle by the Trustee's Deed dated November 5, 2009, The 
Highlands lost the ability to pursue even their limited condemnation claim against PWJ's 
interest in the PWJ Parcel, as PWJ's interest in the land, and The Highland's attempt to 
obtain that interest by condemnation, was wiped out by the foreclosure. Accordingly, the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. 
Second, The Highlands' initiation of the underlying action was and is incredibly 
premature. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) provides that "[e]ach person who seeks to 
acquire property by eminent domain . . . shall... advise the property owner of the 
owner's rights to mediation and arbitration under Section 78B-6-522, including the name 
and current telephone number of the property rights ombudsman . . . ." (emphasis 
added.) The undisputed record below demonstrates that The Highlands failed to comply 
with this statutory requirement before it filed the Complaint. This failure it futile to The 
Highlands'claims. 
Furthermore, The Highlands failed to demonstrate below, and fails to demonstrate 
or even allege here, that the "road" The Highlands seeks to access by condemning private 
property for an easement has been constructed and otherwise approved for use by 
residents of The Highlands or anyone else. Indeed, the Talisman Parkway which The 
Highlands wants to access has not been constructed, and may never be constructed. 
Accordingly, any condemnation for an easement to provide an access would be 
premature where it is uncertain as to whether the condemned property and proposed 
10 
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easement would even lead to another public road or otherwise fulfill its intended purpose. 
As a result, this appeal should be dismissed without any consideration of the merits 
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and also because this entire 
proceeding is premature and unnecessary. 
Even if this Court has jurisdiction and The Highlands' condemnation action is not 
premature, BV Jordanelle is entitled to prevail on the merits, and Judge Pullan's logical 
and well-reasoned decision should be affirmed. Simply put, the Eminent Domain Act 
does not authorize the conduct called for by The Highlands, namely, the condemnation 
by a private landowner of its neighbor's land to be used as a road to access that private 
landowner's private development. For reasons that should be too obvious to mention, a 
private party seeking to exercise the power of eminent domain must have direct 
authorization from the Legislature. This authorization can be express or, in some 
instances, clearly implied. There is no question that the Eminent Domain Act does not 
give express authorization to The Highlands in this case. Accordingly, the question is 
whether the Eminent Domain Act impliedly authorizes a private limited liability 
company to condemn property for construction of a road to its private residential 
development. The answer to that question is an emphatic no. Indeed, the public policy 
implications of any other answer are difficult to even fathom. If the Utah Legislature 
wants to give private landowners the power to condemn their neighbor's property without 
any federal, state or local governmental entity being involved in the process it certainly 
can do so, but it has not done so yet and may elect for numerous reasons to never do so. 
The Highlands would interpret the absence of express references to government 
11 
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entities in section 502—entities that would likely be impliedly if not expressly authorized 
to exercise this authority—as evidence that any private party has the authority under the 
Eminent Domain Act to condemn private property, so long as it is for a public use. The 
Highlands also looks for support in half-century and century old cases where courts 
addressed the public uses of mining and water. The Highlands' arguments are misplaced 
and otherwise unpersuasive. 
First, because public entities may and do use their eminent domain authority to 
establish and extend public streets, denying a private party this enormous power will not 
render worthless or seriously impair the grant of authority to condemn. Second, the 
various statutes comprising the Eminent Domain Act demonstrate clearly that the Utah 
Legislature intended for only public entities to exercise this powerful authority. Third, 
the outdated cases cited by The Highlands are unpersuasive because the Eminent Domain 
Act has significantly changed since those cases were decided and those courts addressed 
"public purposes" significantly different than the one at issue in this case. Finally, public 
policy strongly supports an unequivocal rejection of The Highlands' proposed theory on 
eminent domain. Under The Highlands' theory, any private party can exercise the power 
of eminent domain to condemn another's private property, provided the land taken is for 
a public purpose. In other words, a non-resident could purchase landlocked property in 
Utah without considering access to the property, and, so long as he was seeking to build a 
road or byway to a proposed residence, such an individual could simply exercise eminent 
domain against adjacent landowners. Fortunately, such is not the law in Utah. Judge 
Pullan's decision should be affirmed in all respects. 
12 
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ARGUMENT 
The Highlands' appeal should be denied for at least three independent reasons, the 
first two of which have nothing to do with the merits. First, this Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction over the appeal in light of The Highlands' failure to name BV Lending 
in the original Complaint and the subsequent foreclosure of the original defendant's 
interest in the property at issue. Second, this action was premature when it was filed and 
it remains premature now because (1) the undisputed record demonstrates that The 
Highlands failed to satisfy its obligations under the Eminent Domain Act before initiating 
this action, and (2) the Talisman Parkway—which is the "road" on BV Jordanelle's 
property that The Highlands seeks to access by condemning private property for an 
easement—has not even been constructed. Third, the Eminent Domain Act does not 
expressly or impliedly authorize private parties to exercise eminent domain to take 
property for the purpose of constructing a road to a proposed private residential 
development. It simply cannot be the law, as suggested by The Highlands, that any 
private party may exercise the fundamental power of eminent domain so long as it seeks 
to do so for a statutorily-defined public use. 
I. THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS 
APPEAL, AND THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED, 
As explained in BV Jordanelle's prior briefing to this Court, Utah law requires 
that to obtain an easement by eminent domain across real property, a condemnor (such as 
The Highlands) must name as defendants in the Complaint all persons who qualify as 
2
 Because the parties have already submitted briefs specifically addressing this issue, BV 
Jordanelle will only briefly summarize its jurisdictional argument in this brief. 
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"owners" or "claimants" of the property, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507(l)(b), including 
any persons claiming any valuable right or interest, including a security interest. See 
Brigham City v. Chase, 85 P. 436, 438-439 (Utah 1906) (explaining that the statutory 
terms "owner" and "claimant" in the context of eminent domain proceedings include all 
persons having "any lawful interest in the property" and citing inclusion of mortgagees, 
among others). Cf. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co. v. Dixie #11 P'ship, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (providing example of case where condemnor seeking an easement properly 
named both the owner and the beneficiary under the trust deed). In this case, BV 
Jordanelle's predecessor in interest, BV Lending, was the named beneficiary of an 
existing, recorded Deed of Trust on the PWJ Parcel securing promissory notes written by 
PWJ for more than six million dollars at the time of the filing of the Complaint. That 
Deed of Trust was of record and on file with the Wasatch County Recorder's Office, 
providing record notice to the world of BV Lending's interest in the PWJ Parcel. 
Accordingly, BV Lending held an interest in PWJ Parcel, i.e., it was a claimant, and thus 
was a necessary party to the condemnation suit below under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
507(l)(b). BV Lending could not be made to suffer injury to its security interest (and 
contingent right to become an owner in the event of a foreclosure) without due process of 
law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the consequence of the condemnor's 
failure to name an interested party "is that against the omitted persons the condemnation 
will be nugatory." See Brigham City, 85 P. at 439. Consequently, the result of The 
Highlands' failure to name BV Lending as a defendant below is that the trial court, and 
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now this Court, lacked jurisdiction to make any rulings which could impair the interest in 
the PWJ Parcel held by BV Lending or its successor, BV Jordanelle, but it could make 
rulings concerning PWJ's interest in the parcel. See Town ofTremonton v. Johnston, 164 
P. 190 (Utah 1917) (holding that statutory procedures for instituting eminent domain 
proceedings are jurisdictional and cannot be disregarded). 
Moreover, upon the completion of the foreclosure of PWJ's interest in the PWJ 
Parcel and conveyance of the PWJ parcel to BV Jordanelle by the Trustee's Deed dated 
November 5, 2009, The Highlands lost the ability to pursue even their limited 
condemnation claim against PWJ's interest in the PWJ Parcel, because PWJ's interest 
ceased to exist. By operation of Utah law, the Trustee's Deed conveyed to the purchaser 
at the trustee's sale, i.e., BV Jordanelle, "without right of redemption, the trustee's title 
and all right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor [i.e., PWJ] and the trustor's successors 
in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or under them [i.e., The Highlands] in 
and to the property sold .. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(3). In short, any claim The 
Highlands could have acquired to the PWJ Parcel through the instant lawsuit is a claim 
which has now been conveyed to BV Jordanelle by operation of the statute. This Court 
lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, and it should be dismissed.3 
3
 Assume that The Highlands had succeeded below and had obtained from Judge Pullan 
an order conveying the easement it requests prior to the foreclosure sale occurring. Any 
conveyance of the easement to The Highlands would have been encumbered by the BV 
Lending Deed of Trust, and the foreclosure of that Deed of Trust would have eliminated 
The Highlands' title along with the title held by PWJ to the remaining PWJ Parcel. In 
other words, any conveyance of a part of the PWJ Parcel to The Highlands, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily under a condemnation order, would have been encumbered 
by the prior, recorded Deed of Trust. 
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II. THE HIGHLANDS PREMATURELY INITIATED THE UNDERLYING 
ACTION, AND THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
The underlying action before Judge Pullan was initiated prematurely for at least 
two reasons. First, The Highlands failed to satisfy its obligations under the Eminent 
Domain Act before initiating this action. Second, and more importantly than that 
procedural defect, the "road" on BV Jordanelle's property that The Highlands seeks to 
access for an easement has not even been constructed, and may never be constructed. In 
other words, even if the Court were to allow The Highlands to condemn the 200 feet or so 
of land it wants for the construction of a short byway, there is no guarantee that this 
byway would ever be connected to a constructed, dedicated public road. 
A. The Highlands Failed to Satisfy Its Statutory Pre-Requisites to Filing 
an Eminent Domain Action, 
The Utah Legislature, which undoubtedly values the protection of private property 
rights, has expressly mandated that parties take certain actions before initiating an 
eminent domain action. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-504 & 505. Specifically, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) provides that "[e]ach person who seeks to acquire property 
by eminent domain . . . shall. . . advise the property owner of the owner's rights to 
mediation and arbitration under Section 78B-6-522, including the name and current 
telephone number of the property rights ombudsman . . . ." (emphasis added.) Created in 
1997,4 the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman (hereinafter the "OPRO") provides 
critical services to landowners, including advising property owners "about takings, 
4
 The legislation creating the OPRO passed unanimously through both the Utah House of 
Representatives and the Senate. See Session Laws of Utah 2004, Chap. 233 § 10. 
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eminent domain, and land use law." Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-203. When dealing with 
an area of law such as takings and eminent domain, the public policy of providing 
landowners with tools to protect their property interests is obvious, especially in light of 
the inherent and inalienable property rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. See 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 1. But regardless of the reasons underlying this statutory 
requirement, the Utah Legislature has left no doubt as to the pre-lawsuit requirements for 
a party seeking to condemn private property; among other things, that party shall inform 
the landowner of his or her rights, including the name and current telephone number of 
the property rights ombudsman. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) (emphasis added.) 
That indisputably did not happen here. 
In this case, The Highlands sent a letter to PWJ, wherein it stated: 
Under section 78-34-4.5, my client is required to notify your client of its 
right to seek mediation or arbitration under Section 78-34-21 with the Utah 
State Property Rights Ombudsman, Heber M. Wells Building, 2nd Floor, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(R. 2.) Glaringly absent from this letter is the actual name of the ombudsman, or the 
telephone number for the ombudsman. This omission did not go unnoticed by Judge 
Pullan. In his final order, Judge Pullan made the following findings of fact: 
16. On September 5, 2008, The Highlands hand-delivered a letter to 
PWJ. The letter generally informed PWJ of its rights under section 
78B-6-505(2)(a) of the Utah Code. 
17. The letter did not include the name and current telephone number of 
the property rights ombudsman, as required by section 78B-6-
505(2)(a) of the Utah Code. 
(R. 105.) The Highlands has not challenged these findings of fact and the Utah 
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Legislature has left no wiggle room on this issue. The Highlands' failure to satisfy the 
requirements under section 505(2)(a) render its Complaint premature and serves as an 
additional basis to either affirm the district court or otherwise dismiss this appeal. 
B. The Requested Easement over BV Jordanelle's Land Would Connect 
to no Existing, Constructed Public Road. 
"A condemnation action to support a public benefit that may never be initiated is 
premature." Bd. of County Comm 'rs of the County of Morgan v. Kobobel, 176 P.3d 860, 
865 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007); see also Colorado & S. Ry. v. Dist. Court, 493 P.2d 657, 659 
(Colo. 1972) (recognizing that if the property sought to be condemned by the railroad 
would ultimately not be used as a point of crossing, the "railroad would have acquired 
land or an easement that it cannot use, and the one against whom the decree was entered 
would have had taken from it property actually not subject to condemnation"); Silver 
Dollar Metro. Dist. v. Goltra, 66 P.3d 170, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that 
"condemning the property for core drilling is not a taking for a public use because the 
taking would be to determine if it is possible that the property could be used for a public 
use in the future and to explore and compete with other projects.") 
In this case, The Highlands seeks to connect its planned development on the 
Highlands Parcel to a proposed and platted road known as the Talisman Parkway by 
building a road over the neighboring PWJ Parcel owned by BV Jordanelle. (R. 105.) 
However, The Highlands has not demonstrated (because it cannot do so) that the 
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Talisman Parkway is an existing, constructed public road.5 This failure is significant 
because without a constructed public road to which the proposed easement could connect, 
the stated public use of providing public access to a residential development would not be 
immediately available, and it is possible that it would never be available. In other words, 
the "public use" may never be initiated. Accordingly, The Highlands' action is 
premature, and this appeal should be dismissed. See, e.g., Kobobel, 176 P.3d at 865. 
III. JUDGE PULLAN PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE HIGHLANDS WAS 
NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE TO EXERCISE 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO CONDEMN AN EASEMENT 
OVER ITS NEIGHBOR'S PROPERTY FOR A ROAD. 
This case is not just about whether The Highlands is entitled to an easement over 
200 feet of BV Jordanelle's property so that it can access its property. The ramifications 
of the case are far broader than that. The real question here is whether one private, for 
profit landowner has the right under Utah law to condemn its neighbor's property for a 
road or any other stated public use, when that private, for profit landowner has not been 
expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature to do so. It does not. 
A private party must have direct authority from the Legislature in order to exercise 
eminent domain. See 1 A-3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.03(1) ("The right to 
authorize the exercise of eminent domain is a legislative power. In the absence of direct 
authority from the legislature, there can be no taking of private property for a public use, 
except in cases where the owner consents to the taking."). uThe right to exercise the 
power of eminent domain may be delegated to a private corporation." Id at § 3.03(9)(a); 
5
 Indeed, the Talisman Parkway, which would be partially located on the PWJ Parcel 
owned by BV Jordanelle, has not yet been constructed and may never be constructed. 
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(3)(b)(ii). Such a delegation of authority, however, "must be affirmatively shown either 
by express words or by necessary implication." Id. at § 9(a). And, as Judge Pullan 
rightly recognized, the necessity from which an implied grant of authority might arise 
must be compelling. (R. 99 ("'there can be no implication unless it arises from a 
necessity so absolute that, without it, the grant itself will be defeated. It must, also, be a 
necessity which arises from the very nature of things, over which the corporation has no 
control; it must not be a necessity created by the company itself for its own convenience 
or for the sake of the economy.'" {quoting 1A-3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.03(3)(d) 
Id. at § 3.03(3)(d))), (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, as recognized by the 
Utah Supreme Court, a grant of eminent domain authority to a private party may only be 
implied where "any other construction of the statute or statutes involved would render 
worthless or seriously impair the grant of power to condemn for the given purposes." 
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950). 
As explained more fully below, The Highlands has in no way been authorized to 
exercise eminent domain to create a road to its proposed residential development. Not 
only is there clearly (and admittedly) no express authorization, but there is likewise no 
implied authority. This logical conclusion is only bolstered when viewed in the context 
of Utah's public policy and the absurdities that would result from adoption of The 
Highlands' theory of eminent domain. 
A. The Eminent Domain Act does not Expressly Authorize The Highlands 
to Exercise Eminent Domain. 
Judge Pullan correctly found, and the Highlands does not appear to dispute, that 
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the Eminent Domain Act does not expressly authorize The Highlands to exercise eminent 
domain to construct a public road to access its proposed residential development. (R. 
93.) This absence of express authorization should not be minimized. In light of the 
strong Constitutional protections regarding property rights in Utah, see Utah Const. Art. 
I, Sec. 1, and the fact that the common definition of "eminent domain" is the power of a 
governmental entity to convert privately owned property, logic dictates that if the Utah 
Legislature intended to authorize private parties to exercise eminent domain to build a 
road to their residential developments, it would have expressly and clearly provided this 
authorization in the Eminent Domain Act. Indeed, Judge Pullan, in his thorough and 
well-written decision below, provided a long list of situations where the Utah Legislature 
has expressly granted to various entities (including private entities) eminent domain 
authority. (R. 98, 99 (citing eighteen different statutes where the Legislature expressly 
granted the power of eminent domain).); see also In the Matter of the Condemnation of 
Certain Land by Norm Luloff 512 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing that the 
Iowa Legislature enacted a statute that provides, in part: "The right to take private 
property for public use is hereby conferred: . . . (2) Upon the owner or lessee of lands, 
which have no public or private way to the lands, for the purpose of providing a public 
way, not exceeding forty feet in width, which will connect with exising public road . . . 
The absence of express authorization in the Eminent Domain Act is compelling 
evidence that the Legislature never intended to authorize a private party to exercise 
eminent domain for the purpose of building a road to a proposed residential development. 
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Indeed, when governmental entities exercise the power for the benefit of the constituents 
they serve, they do so pursuant to express statutory provisions which insure that the 
process if fair, open, deliberate and protective of private property rights. That is why 
Utah's Act, among other things, requires that public votes be taken in public meetings 
after appropriate notice before a condemnation action can be undertaken. These same 
procedural and substantive safeguards do not exist for private entities like The Highlands. 
The Highlands was not required to advertise a public meeting and take a public vote in an 
open meeting before it filed its Complaint to condemn BV Jordanelle's property. Judge 
Pullan was right to dismiss this case, and his decision should be affirmed. 
B. There Is No Implied Authorization in the Eminent Domain Act 
Supporting The Highlands' Position. 
The absence of any implied authority to an entity such as The Highlands is 
manifested in numerous ways. First, because public entities may use eminent domain 
authority to establish and extend public streets (subject to numerous procedural and 
substantive protections as discussed briefly above), denying a private party this enormous 
power will not render worthless or seriously impair the grant of authority to condemn. 
Second, the various statutes comprising the Eminent Domain Act demonstrate that the 
Legislature intended for only public entities to exercise this powerful authority. Third, 
the outdated cases cited by The Highlands are unpersuasive because the Eminent Domain 
Act has significantly changed since those cases were decided and those courts addressed 
"public purposes" significantly different than the one at issue in this case. Fourth, public 
policy strongly supports denying private parties this awesome authority. 
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1. Denying private parties the authority to exercise eminent 
domain will not render worthless or meaningless Section 501 of 
the Eminent Domain Act. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that a grant of eminent domain authority may be 
implied if "any other construction of the statute or statutes involved would render 
worthless or seriously impair the grant of power to condemn for the given purposes." 
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950). Accordingly, in order for The 
Highlands to demonstrate that it is impliedly authorized to exercise eminent domain, it 
must demonstrate that its inability to exercise this authority would render worthless or 
seriously impair the grant of power to condemn property for use as a road. See id. There 
is no such gutting of the Eminent Domain Act in this case should the Court deny The 
Highlands' theory. As Judge Pullan recognized, "[u]nder Utah law, counties, cities, and 
towns may use this grant of eminent domain authority to establish and extend public 
streets. Therefore, denying private parties the right to condemn property for this public 
use will not 'render worthless or seriously impair' the express grant of eminent domain 
authority is section 78B-6-501." (R. 92.); see also Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628. 
As Judge Pullan correctly recognized, if the "road" that The Highlands wants to 
build is truly necessary to benefit and advance the public interest, either Wasatch County 
or the Utah Department of Transportation can obtain the property and build the road. 
Neither entity, of course, has done so. There simply is no implied authorization to The 
Highlands, and Judge Pullan should be affirmed.6 
6
 In fact, Wasatch County, the public entity that would have the authority to exercise 
eminent domain in this situation and an entity that is in a much better position to 
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2. The various statutes comprising the Eminent Domain Act 
support the position that only public entities may exercise 
eminent domain to condemn land for use of a public road. 
The Highlands attempts to limit the Court's analysis to only the language of 
section 501 of the Eminent Domain Act in the hope that the other sections of the Act will 
be ignored. (See, e.g., Appl'ts. Br. at (including only section 501 as a controlling statute.) 
The Eminent Domain Act, however, consists of much more than just section 501. And 
subsequent sections of the Eminent Domain Act demonstrate that the Legislature did not 
intend to grant private parties the authority to exercise eminent domain to condemn land 
for construction of a private road to a residence. 
For example, in outlining the conditions precedent to taking under the Eminent 
Domain Act, the Legislature provided that: 
(2) (a) As used in this section, "governing body" means: 
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the 
county, city, or town; and 
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person 
or body with authority to govern the affairs of the political 
subdivision. 
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state 
unless the governing body of the political subdivision approves the 
taking. 
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent 
domain action, the governing body of each political subdivision 
intending to take property shall provide written notice to each owner 
of property to be taken of each public meeting of the political 
understand or recognize what is a "public use," has decided in its wisdom not to exercise 
its eminent domain authority. (R. 115.) 
n 
Indeed, the argument that this Court should limit its analysis to section 501 is belied by 
the plain language of that very section. Section 501 provides that "[s]ubject to the 
provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the 
following public uses . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501. 
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subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking 
is expected to occur and allow the property owner the opportunity to 
be heard on the proposed taking. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504. Nowhere in the Eminent Domain Act is there a definition 
of "private party" or other definition of who may exercise eminent domain authority. 
Furthermore, when the Legislature continues to outline the steps that must be 
taken before initiating an eminent domain action, the language makes sense only if it is a 
public entity that is exercising the authority: 
Each person who seeks to acquire property by eminent domain or 
who intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property 
cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall: 
(1) before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain 
action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for 
the purchase of the property; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505. What private party is going to be "taking a final vote to 
approve the filing of an eminent domain action? The obvious purpose of this requirement 
is to require those elected and appointed officials who do the public's work to think long 
and hard before they vote to condemn someone's property, even if the property is going 
to be condemned for the noblest of purposes. 
In short, the Eminent Domain Act's defining of a "governing body" and its 
reference to "a final vote" demonstrates that, absent express authorization, only public 
entities are authorized to exercise eminent domain under the Eminent Domain Act, and 
subject to the procedural and substantive protections of the Act. Judge Pullan's ruling 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
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3. The outdated cases relied on by The Highlands are misplaced 
and otherwise unpersuasive. 
The Utah cases relied on by The Highlands are not controlling and otherwise are 
unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the current Eminent Domain Act is 
significantly different from the respective eminent domain acts addressed by the early 
Utah cases. Second, as explained by Judge Pullan, these early cases "involve the 
development of Utah's natural resources, scarce or abundant." (R. 92.) 
First, none of the respective versions of the eminent domain act addressed by the 
cases cited by The Highlands included the current statutes regarding the conditions 
precedent to a taking and the requirements with respect to the property rights 
ombudsman. This is significant because these two statutes provide persuasive evidence 
that the Utah Legislature intends for only public entities to exercise eminent domain, 
unless there is a clear and express authorization to the contrary. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78B-6-504 & 505. Consequently, the decisions of the Utah courts interpreting prior 
versions of the Eminent Domain Act are simply unpersuasive. 
Second, all of the Utah cases cited by The Highlands' in support of its position 
that it can condemn BV Jordanelle's property to build a road addressed either issues of 
mining or water. (See Appl'ts. Br. at 8-15.) As Judge Pullan recognized in 
distinguishing those cases, the "implied delegation of eminent domain authority to private 
mining interests was grounded upon two critical realities. First, the success of the mining 
O 
The Highlands submitted only one of the statutes in the eminent domain act on the 
books in 1898 and 1917. Attached hereto as Addendum 1 and 2 are full copies of the 
eminent domain act for those years, respectively. 
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industry was inextricably tied to Utah's economy generally. Second, the natural 
problems obstructing the development of that industry were significant." (R. 94.) 
Accordingly, the district court correctly recognized a critical and dispositive 
difference between the cases relied upon by The Highlands and this case. In particular, 
Judge Pullan recognized that Utah courts have found an implied grant of authority to a 
private party to exercise eminent domain only in cases involving the development of 
Utah's natural resources, and they did so because of the importance of that development 
to Utah's economic well-being and the difficulty that existed at the time to making that 
development successful. In any event, the eminent domain acts at issue in those cases are 
different than the current version. 
Unlike in those early Utah cases cited by The Highlands, there simply is no 
evidence or suggestion that the "construction of public streets providing access to 
residential development is inextricably tied to the strength of Utah's economy generally." 
(R. 92.) The Utah cases relied on by The Highlands are simply unpersuasive. The 
district court should be affirmed.9 
4. Strong public policy reasons exist to reject of The Highlands' position. 
Finally, public policy strongly supports an unequivocal rejection of The 
9
 The Nevada case cited by The Highlands, Glenbrook Homeowners Ass yn, Inc. v. Pettitt, 
919 P.2d 1061 (Nev. 1996), is likewise unpersuasive. Aside from the fact that it is 
obviously not a Utah case or a case addressing Utah's Eminent Domain Act, the Nevada 
eminent domain act at issue expressly limited who could exercise eminent domain 
power in certain situations. Id. at 787 (noting that the Nevada statute provided that 
"[o]nly a public agency may exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf of a 
monorail. . ."). Accordingly, the Nevada court held that the rest of the provisions 
implicitly authorized private entities to exercise the power of eminent domain. Id. 
There is no such limiting language in Utah's Eminent Domain Act. 
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Highlands' proposed theory on eminent domain. The Utah Constitution lists one's right 
to possess and protect property rights as an inherent and inalienable right. Utah Const. 
Art. I, Sec. 1. However, under The Highlands' theory, any private party can exercise the 
power of eminent domain and take his or her neighbor's property, provided the land 
taken is going to be used for a public purpose. In other words, a non-resident could 
purchase landlocked property in Utah without any consideration regarding access to the 
property (and for a bargain basement price), and he could thereafter solve his access 
problem by using the power of eminent domain to acquire his neighbor's property to 
build a road or byway to a proposed residence. Not only would the recognition of such 
an extreme power ignore the Utah Constitution, but it would undoubtedly flood the courts 
with a wave of eminent domain actions brought by private landowners against their 
neighbors. Judge Pullan was right to rule against The Highlands below, and this Court 
should do likewise here. The district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the district court 
in this matter. 
DATED this 16th day of April 2010. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
/s/ Michael R. Johnson 
Michael R. Johnson 
Matthew M. Cannon 
Attorneys for BVJordanelle 
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relative to civil actions, appeals, and new trials, so far as they are not inconsist-JI 
ent with the provisions of this chapter apply to the proceedings mentioned in tliisfl 
chapter. [O. L. § 3804. Il-
eal. C. Civ. P. i 1177*. ~J 
CHAPTER 65. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
3588 . Exerc i sed in behal f of w h a t uses . Subject to the provisions^ 
of this chapter, the right of eminent domain maybe exercised in behalf of the folJ,J 
lowing public uses: 
1. All public uses authorized by the government of the United States. 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other pub| 
lie uses authorized by the legislature. . . J p 
3. Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporatep 
city or town, or school district; reservoirs, ean'als, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, oJ|p 
pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or incorpo^ 
rated city or town, or for dradning any county, or incorporated city or town;Uor|i 
raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and wideniigjM 
deepening, or straightening their channels; for roads, streets, and alleys, and'ajlg 
other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorporated city or town, or fficg 
inhabitants thereof. 
4. Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
roads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines jf | | l 
road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and s t ra |p | 
railways for public transportation. ' | § | | 
5. Reservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, ^ u ? | | | 
ducts, and pipes for supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other works ^ ° ^ | | 
tEe reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigating Pm3f|| 
poses, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or for floating logs and lumber onJL 
streams not navigable. ' Jsfi 
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ling places to facilitate the milling, smelting,, or other reduction of ores, or'file 
forking of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of 
failings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction |of ores, or from mines; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe lines, tanks, or reser-
lvofr3 > also &11 occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different 
.^ inioes , mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, of any place for |§§§£be flow, deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. • 
i*3 -••*••-• - By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines. 
,.^........ 9- Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten 
[Sffaniilies, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or 
'^feniTersity. 
l$p£ •• 10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for sup-
I p f e ^ n g and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of 
s|%enerating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat. 
Sf$*f • 11. Cemeteries or public parks. [C. L. § 3841*; '90, p. 37; '92, pp. 42, 92; 
l » 0 > p. 316.. ;: Col. C. Civ. P. 11238*. 
^fSup.'95,p.33 l§1233*. . 
^%U:iEminent domain for pipes, tanks. | i i#Sra l pas, 91552; for right of way for canals, ditches, 
api-efc.,1 1277; f o r railroads, \ 436: 




Under section 3841, 0. L. 1888, providing that 
the right of eminent domain may be exercised in 
behalf of steam and horse railroads; "held, that by 
implication this right may be exercised in behalf 
of electrical railways. Ogden City Railway Com-
pany v. Ogden City, 7 XT. 207; 26 P. 288. 
^ ^ | / ; -3589. Es t a t e s a n d r i g h t s subject to condemnat ion . The following 
iasa classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public • 
lie: 
^ . 1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for perma-
ifnSit buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, 
i p f o r an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings .of a 
§|niiie, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores. 
'^""'•..2. An easement, when taken for any other use. ||B';-3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to take 
refrom such earth, gravel, 'stones, trees, and timber as maybe necessary for | g m e public use. [C. L. § 3842*. : 
l l l f i . C. Civ. P. I 1239* 
" ^ ^ ' 3 5 9 0 . P rope r ty subject t o condemnat ion . The private property 
^Mch may be taken under this chapter includes: 
^
1tferl. All real property belonging to any person. 
;
'"'S. Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city or 
ilpwa, not appropriated to some public use. 
!&§| iS- Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property shall 
A
 |Mot -be taken unlesB for a more necessary public use than that "to which it has been 
[^atfeady appropriated. 
^ S | ^ U . Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; 
'^m^^ded, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways, railroadB, 
g a t h e r more necessary public use. 
* 1l$r §• • All rights of way for any and all. purposes mentioned in section thirty-|f&. hundred and eighty-eight, and any and all structures and improvements 
p¥ereon, and the lands held or used in connection therewith, Bhall be subject to 
B m S o n n e c t e d with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improve-
J | ^ u t or structure thereon. They shall also be subject to a limited use in common 
"||fp^u the owner thereof, when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, 
« ! ? £ connections shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest 
l l ^ ib l i c benefit and the least private injury. |fep|'; 6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public 
i|ge.when such taking is authorized by law. [C. L. § 3843. 
| | | C a l . C. Civ. P. g 1240*. • 
§|f?^0P,M*y zn& franchises of private corporations subject to eminent domain, Con. art. 12, sec. 11. 
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3 5 9 1 . Condi t ions p receden t t o condemnat ion . Before property can' 
be taken it mnst appear: 
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a nse authorized by law. 
2. That the taking is necessary to such nse. 
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which 
it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. [C. L. § 3844. 
Cal. a Civ. P. i 1241. . 
3592 . R i g h t t o en te r t o m a k e survey, etc. Damage . In all cases-' 
where land is required for public use, .the person or corporation or his or its agents 
in charge of such use, may survey and locate the same; but it must be located in 
the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the 
least private injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter. The person 
or corporation or his or its agents in charge of such public use, may enter upon 
the land and make examinations, surveys, and maps thereof, and such entry shall, 
constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners of the lands, except for 
injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness, or malice. [C. L. § 3845. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11242*. 
. ; 3 5 9 3 . Ju r i sd ic t ion in d is t r ic t cour t . •• Compla in t verified. .AH 
pfdeeedings under this chapter must be brought in the district court for the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated. The complaint in' 
such cases must be verified. [0. L. § 3846*. 
Cal. C. CiY. F. 11243*. 
3594 . Con ten t s of compla in t . The complaint must contain: 
1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or person in charge 
of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiff. 
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a , 
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants. 
3. A. statement of the right of the plaintiff. 
4. If a right of way be sought, the complaint must show the location, gen- • 
era! route, and termini, and must be accompanied with a map thereof, so far a& 
the same is involved in the action or proceeding. 
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the 
same includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All parcels 
lying in the county and required for the same public, use-may be included in the -
same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the, court * may 
consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of parties. [0. L. § 3847. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11244*. debtedness aTe " owners " hereunder. 0. S. L. and. 
SUBDV. 2. Grantors in trust deed to secure in- U. 2J. By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 U. 505; 27 P. 693. 
3 5 9 5 . All p a r t i e s in in te res t m a y appear . All persons in occupation' 
of, or having or claiming an interest in, any of the property described in the 
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereofj though not named, may* 
appear, plead, and defend, each in respect to his own property or interest, or 
that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. [C. L. § 3849. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 21246. 
3596 . P o w e r of t h e court . The court or judge thereof sha.ll have 
power: 
1. To determine the conditions specified in section thirty-five hundred and 
ninety-one; to determine the places of making connections and crossings, and to 
regulate the manner thereof and of enjoying the common use mentioned in the 
fifth subdivision of section thirty-five hundred and ninety. 
2. To hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the property 
sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor. 
3. To determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condenv 
nation of the same property. [C. L. § 3850. . . . - . • ' 
Cal. C. Oiv. P. 21247* ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' 
fr. 
# 
. Cal. ( 
Privf 
ftfr pul 
1, Boc. J 
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3 5 9 7 . Occupancy of p remises p e n d i n g act ion. Notice. Hear -
t i n g . Bond. Res t r a in ing order. The plaintiff may move the court or a 
judge thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the defend-
ant, if he is a resident of the county, or has appeared in the action, otherwise by 
serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting 
the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, pending the action, 
and to do such work thereon as may be required for the easement sought, accord-
ing to its nature. The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by affidavit or 
otherwise, of the value of the premises sought to be condemned and of the dam-
• &ges which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a 
' speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion according to the equity 
;. of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to the parties. If the 
motion is granted, the court or judge shall require the plaintiff to execute and 
file in court a bond to the defendant, with sureties to be approved by the court or 
judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by the court or judge, not less than double the 
. value of the premises sought to be condemned and the damages which will ensue 
from, condemnation, as the same may appear to the court or judge on the hearing, 
and conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the premises and all damages in 
• case the property is condemned, and to pay all damages arising from occupation 
before judgment in case the premises are'not condemned, and all costs adjudged 
to the defendant in the action. The sureties shall justify before the court or 
judge after a reasonable notice to the defendant of the time andpiaceof justifica-
tion. The amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and shall 
:not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The court or judge may also, 
"pending the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or interfering with the 
occupation of the premises and the doing thereon of the work required for the 
.easement. ['92, pp. 2-3*. 
3 5 9 8 . Damages , h o w assessed. The court, jury, commissioners, or 
referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties 
"to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
£,•;.. 1. • The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements 
-thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest 
.therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each 
••estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. 
;•.' 2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a large 
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, 
• by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the 
*: construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
p; . ' 3 . If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the 
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages. 
.>;': " 4. Separately, how much the portion not Bought to be condemned, and each 
; estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the 
.improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be equal to 
;the- damages assessed, under subdivision two of this section, the owner of the 
<parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; 
but if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be 
' 8educted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed 
in addition to the value of the portion taken. 
r•>. 5. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of 
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad between such railroad 
and other adjoining lands of the defendant; and the cost of cattle guards where 
.fences may cross the line of Buch railroad. 
. •; 6. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source of 
..damages separately. [C. L. § 3851*. 
r Cal. C. Civ. P. § 1248*. Where receiver built over unoccupied public 
. Private property shall not be taken or damaged land to which a party afterward acquires title, he 
aor public use'without just compensation, Con. art. cannot recoveT as damages ..the value of the rail-
1, sec. 22. 
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eminent domain, if he should not consent to sucvtP 
use of it, he cannot recover as damages the value 'I 
of such Rchoolhonse. Chase v. Jemmett, 8 IT. 231: '-5i 
30 P. 757. 
road's improvements. Denver & E. G. W. By. Co. 
v. Stancliff, 4 TJ. 117; 7 P. 530. 
Where land taken in good faith for the erection 
of a schoolhouse, the owner not being known, but 
with intention to acquire title by proceedings in 
3599 . D a m a g e s deemed accrued a t da te of service. For the pur-;, 
pose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to 
have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that 
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, | 
and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, i 
in all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last section. Jjjq';* 
improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of service of sum-:^ 
mons, shall be included-in the assessment of compensation or damages. [0. L.1!§ 
§ 3852. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. i 1249*. 
3600 . Act ion b e g u n a n e w w h e r e defendant 's t i t le defective. If | ¥ 
the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause, the'-P 
plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same as in this chapter" | 
prescribed. [C. L. § 3853. / ' 
* Cal. C. Civ. P. 11250. -.•> 
3 6 0 1 . D a m a g e s t o be p a i d w i t h i n t h i r t y days . Bond for ra i l road ,
 iv 
fence. The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay the sumJIIj 
of money assessed; and, if the plaintiff is a railroad company, it shall also exe^fft 
cute to the defendant a bond, with sureties, to be determined and approved by | | | 
the court or judge, conditioned that the plaintiff shall build proper fences within'f" 
six months from the time the railroad is built on or over the land taken. In kaf 
action on the bond all damages sustained and the cost of the construction of such; 
fences may be recovered. [C. L. 
Cal. C. Civ. P. ? 1251*. 
3602 . Id. To w h o m paid. Execu t ion if n o t paid. Annul l ing]^ 
proceedings . Payment may be made to the defendants entitled thereto, or theff 
money may be deposited in court for the defendants and be distributed to thosefp 
entitled thereto. If the money be not so paid or deposited, the defendants niaypfjl 
have execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be made on execution/^ 
the court upon a showing to that effect, must set aside and annul the entire pro^ffl 
ceedings, and restore possession of the property to the defendants if possession'|§ 
has been taken by the plaintiff. [C. L. § 3855. ; ^|jf * 
Cal. C." Civ. P. 11252. ' ••-'** 
3 6 0 3 . F i n a l order m a d e u p o n paymen t . Record ing same. "When|ff 
payments have been made (and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects to give one),f| 
as required by the last two sections, the court must make a final order of CODX^ 
demnation, which must describe the property condemned and the purpose of suc3f|) 
condemnation. A copy of the order must be filed in the office of the reeorderv6fj|| 
the county, and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the 
plaintiff for the purpose -therein specified. [0. L. § 3856. ^ 
' Cal. C. Civ. P. 11253. •' ~$lp 
3 6 0 4 . Author iz ing o c c u p a n c y b y plaintiff. Deposit . P a y m e n t : ! 
Effect. At any time after the entry of judgment, or pending an appeal from J* 
the judgment to the supreme court, whenever the plaintiff shall have paid mto.$ 
court for the defendant the full amount of the judgment, and such further sunt" 
as may be required by the court as a fund to pay any further damages and 
§ 3854*. 
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Ibrbperty duiing the pendency of and until the final conclusion of the litigation, 
H l l and may, if necessary, stay all actions and proceedings against the plaintiff on 
ipllaccount thereof. • The defendant, "who is entitled to the money paid into court 
plf. for him upon any judgment, shall be entitled to demand and receive the same 
%fc at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order therefor from the court. I t shall 
IP/be the duty of the court or a judge thereof, upon application being made by such 
^ defendant, to order and direct that the money so paid into court for him'be 
H> delivered to him upon his filing a satisfaction of the judgment, or upon his filing 
'" " a receipt therefor, and an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding, 
except as to the amount of damages that he may be entitled to in the event that 
a new tidal shall be granted. A payment to a defendant, as aforesaid, shall be 
held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by him. 
excepting his claim for greater compensation. [C. L. § 3857. 
• Cal. C. Civ. P. 11254*. 
3605.* Appor t i onmen t of costs . Costs may be allowed or not, and if 
allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides, in 
the discretion of the court. [C. L. § 3858. 
, ' Cal. C. Civ. P. 11255. 
3606 . P rocedure appl icable . Except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter, the provisions of this code relative to civil actions, new trials, and appeals, 
shall be applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings in this 
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11256*. 
J •.. 3607 . E i g h t s of cities a n d t o w n s n o t affected. Nothing in this code 
Vihust be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the taking of 
•'•property in any city or town for street purposes. [C. L. § 3860.' 
f Cal. a CSv. P. ? 1263. 
3 6 0 8 . Crossings to be m a d e a n d k e p t in repair . A party obtaining 
; ai right of way shall, without delay, construct such crossings as may be required 
V-bythe court or judge, and shall keep them and the way itself in good repair. | [J00, pp. 39, 40*. 
mi-
CHAPTER 66. 
• QUO WABKANTO. ' 
3609 . Act ion in n a m e of s t a t e , a g a i n s t w h o m . A civil action ma}' 
be brought in the name of the state: 
1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exer-
cises, a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, within this state, or an office 
in a corporation created by the authority of this state. 
2. Against a public officer, civil or military, who does or suffers an act 
'which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office. 
.', 3. Against an association of persons who-act as a corporation within this 
state without being legally incorporated. [C. L. § 3529*. 
Mont. Civ. P. 11410. Cal. C. Civ. P. i 803* 
; ' Original jurisdiction in supreme and in district courts, Con. art. 8, sees. 4, 7. 
3610 . Id. Aga ins t a corpora t ion . A like action may be brought 
against a corporation: 
1. When it has off ended against a provision of an act by or under which it 
was created, altered, or renewed, or any act altering or amending such acts. 
2. When it has forfeited its privileges and franchises by non-user. 
. 3. When it has committed or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender 
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises. 
• l i 
' 'I 
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distent with the provisions of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned 
'in this chapter.-
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1177* . 
CHAPTER 65. 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
c > ^ 
fr tf\ 
m 
ms of this code<-r|| 
y are not iricori-l" 
7330.' (3588.) Exercised in behalf of wKat uses. Subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised m behalf 
of the following-public uses: 
1; All public uses authorized by the government of the United btates; • 
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other 
public uses authorized by the legislature; 
•3. Public-buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporated 
city or town, or school district; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, 
or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or 
incorporated city or town, or for draining any county,-or incorporated city or 
town; .for'raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, 
and widening, deepening, or straightening their channels; for roads^ streets, 
and alleys, and all other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorpo-
' rated city or town, or the inhabitants thereof; 
• 4 / Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, by-
roads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines 
or rpad locomotives, roads for logging or^  lumbering purposes, and railroads 
and'street railways for public transportation; A ,
 V 
5/ Reservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches; flumes, tunnels, aque- 7 4 ' / • J • 
ducts, and pipes for the supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other ^ r f a J<p 
works'for the reduction of ores with water for domestic or other uses, or for / - f ^ ) . 
irrigation-purposes, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or for floating logs rr > 
and lumber on streams not navigable ; 
* 6. Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dump-
ing places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the 
working of mines',"quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits; outlets, natural 
or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse, or w;ater from 
.mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction of ores; or from' mines, quar-
ries* coal mines, or mineral deposits; mill dams;.natural gas or oil pipe lines, 
tanks, or reservoirs; also any occupancy in common by the owners or posses-
sors of-different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, 
or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit, or 
conduct of tailings or refuse matter; 
7.' By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms; 
ST*' Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines, and sites 
for electric light and power plants; 
9. . Sewerage of any city.or town, or of any settlement of not less than 
ten families^ or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college 
or university; . •. 
• 10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for . 
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose 
of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat; 
' 11. * Cemeteries or public parks; 
12. Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids con-
nected with the manufacture of beet sugar; • . . 
' ' 13. For sites for mills, smelters, .or other works^'for the reduction of j|>A Hf 
ores'and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to I 
take'.lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes, and 
dust- therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the 
powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county where 
m: 
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the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the limits of.ll 
any incorporated city or town; nor unless the proposed condemnor has the ^ & 
right to operate by purchase, option to purchase, or easement, as to at least-^B 
seventy-five per cent of the value of land acreage owned by persons or cor- -ll 
porations situated within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter, o r ' IP-
other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of said four miles iSS 
radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agreements ex- 1ff$i 
isting between the condemnor and the owner of land within said limit and ^ 
providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the re- S t 
duction of ores; nor until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the l I l L 
operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores. ' S f S 
Am' d '01, p. 19; '07, p. 143; W, p. 50. 
(1893) p . Cal. C. Civ. P. , § 1238*. See Sup. 
995, a n d Sup. (1895) p . 33, § 1233*. 
E m i n e n t domain for pipes, t anks , e t c , for 
na tu ra l gas , § 4024; for r igh t of w a y for canals, 
di tches, etc. , § 3466; for rai l roads, for r i gh t of 
w a y a n d for wa te r , § 1228, sub. 3; for* dra inage 
distr ict , § 2046; for city, for wa te r , § 570x2; i r -
r iga t ion distr icts , § 3526; county hospital site, 
§ 2781. 
P r o p e r t y a n d franchises of pr iva te corpora-
t ions subject to eminent domain, Con. a r t 12, 
sec. 11. 
P r i v a t e proper ty shall no t be t aken or d a m -
aged for public use wi thou t j u s t compensation, 
'Con. a r t . 1, sec. 22, and note. 
N o person shall be deprived of property w i t h -
out due process of law, Con. a r t . 1 sec 7, and 
note . 
Condemnat ion by foreign corporation, § 946. 
Condemnat ion by s t a t e armory, § 2884. 
Con. a r t . 1, sec. 22t providing t h a t pr ivate 
property shall no t be t aken or damaged for 
public use wi thou t ju s t compensation, is a 
' l imitat ion on exercise of power of eminent do-
main . 
"Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 U. 368; 57 
P . 1. 
If t h e land on which shade t rees adjacent to 
s idewalk stood w a s owned by the abut t ing 
proper ty owner, t he city could only cu t t h e 
t rees b y condemning the land and upon pay ing jus t compensation. 
Giauque v. S. L. City, 42 U. 89; 129 P . 429. 
Wihere an owner of land on both sides- of 
the h ighway acquired t i t le to the h ighway by 
failure of t he public t o use and work it, she 
could n o t be compelled thereaf ter t o allow 
it to be opened a s a highway, wi thout com-
pensat ion being made . 
Tu t t l e v. Sowadzki, 41 TJ. 501; 126 P . 959. 
RAILROADS: 
Under § 3841, C. L. 1888, providing t h a t t h e 
r igh t of eminent domain m a y be exercised in 
behalf of s t e a m and horse ra i l roads; held, t h a t 
by impl icat ion th is r igh t m a y be exercised in 
behalf of electrical rai lways. 
Ogden City Rai lway Company v. Ogden City, 
7 TJ. 207; 26 P . 288. 
Land which is a pa r t of a rai lroad's r igh t of 
way, b u t no t used for any purpose and no t 
essent ial to t h e enjoyment of such ra i l road ' s 
f ranchise and property, m a y be appropr ia ted 
to t h e use of a duly incorporated t e legraph 
company for t h e purpose of const ruct ing and 
m a i n t a i n i n g i ts lines, since such appropriat ion 
is for a more necessary pubHc use. Measure of 
damages . 
Pos t a l Tel. & C. Co. v. O. S. L. B. B . Co., 23 
U. 474; 65 P . 735 
A city council cannot authorize a permanent 
swi tch t rack , for a pr ivate business only, a long 
a s t r e e t and across a sidewalk, from a s t e am 
ra i l road in t h e s t ree t , to the de t r iment of peo-
ple res id ing on the s t r ee t a n d to the d a m a g e 
of t he i r abu t t i ng proper ty ; the s t ree ts being 
dedicated to public use. 
Cereghino v. O. S. L. B. B . Co., 26 TJ. 467; 
. 73 P . 634. 
A pa r t y whose proper ty Is about to be dam-
aged in a subs tant ia l degree for public use is 
given s a m e remedies as would b e accorded h i m 
if h is p roper ty were actual ly appropria ted for 
public use. 
Stockdale v. B . G. W. By. Co., 28 TJV 201; 77 
P . 849. 
Railroad cannot subject pr iva te property In 
a city to burdens to which i t will be subjected > ? & 
by runn ing of cars and engines over a switch ? i S § 
laid over adjoining property, wi thout proceed- y****--
i ng under l a w of eminent domain. 
I d . • ^ tj^ag! 
CANALS, MINES, ETC.: £ | | I 
T h e provision of this section and §§ 7332. : ' ^^ fe 
7338, render , under ordinary circumstances ' $ 1 8 8 
proper ty appropr ia ted for a public use liable to S p 
condemnat ion for another public use. ••.'$IF 
Sal t L a k e City v. W a t e r & EL P . Co., 24 tr 
249; 67 P . 672. 
A proceeding fay a power company under ttie'VsIL 
eminent domain s t a tu t e to obtain the right to S§1P--
connect a fiume wi th a city's canal for purpose ^ P § 5 1 
of d ischarging w a t e r into it, under t h e pTo-i\tMgm 
visions of th is section and § 7332, is not a suit S i lMp 
to condemn land .belonging to the city, and i t '^Sjg 
is no t necessary to show, as provided in § 7333,'<$1§5| 
t h a t t he use to 'which i t is to be applied by :£. 
power company is a more necessary public u s a - § | | | 
t h a n t h a t to which the city devotes i t ( O n V 
rehear ing , 25 XJ. 456; 71 P . 1069.) g 
Sal t Lake City v. W a t e r & El . P . Co., 2i U , ^ 
249; 67 P . 672. ^ J g j 
Proper tv Is taken for a public use, wit luV$&i 
the provision of t he constitution declaring tliat'Sjfpr 
p r iva te proper ty shall not be taken for publicfj? 
use wi thou t j u s t compensat ion, 'when the tak-':% 
ing is for use t h a t wilt promote the p u b l i c ^ 
interest , and will tend to develop the resources;'^? 
of t h e s ta te . In th i s case a r ight of way for£ 
an i r r igat ion ditch. "U 
N a s h v. Clark, 27 TJ. 158; 75 P . 371; affirmed i § 
198 TJ. S. 361. ' • g l y 
T h e construction and operation of roads an{Jj|l' ~ 
t r a m w a y s for t h e development and w o r k i n g ^ , 
of m i n e s is a public use. v v S 
Highland B. G. M. Co. v. Strlckley, 28 U. 216flj 
78 P . 296; affirmed 200 TJ. S. 525. 'r|p 
W h e r e a s t ree t grade was established but&. 
no t carr ied into effect, and thereafter buildings"^ 
were erected, the city was liable for damages.^ 
. resul t ing from the change of grade. The faclj^ 
t h a t t h e improvements were made before ttyffcafl 
adopt ion of Con. a r t . 1, s e c 22, does no t reyeyipf 
liability. ' ' >M' 
Kimbal l v. S. L. City, 32 IT. 253; 90 P . 3 9 5 . ^ 
H e m p s t e a d v. S. L . City, 32 U . 261; 90-P. 3 f e 
F e l t v. S: L. City, 32 TJ. 275-; 90 P . 402. #M 
W e b b e r v. Sa l t Lake- City, 40 TJ. 221; 120- B^~ 
503 :'6-^ 
L a n n a n v. Waltenspiel , 45 IT. 564; 147 P. 9 0 | i 
A proceeding under § 3467 to obtain ttfie rlgnjjj 
to enlarge an Irrigation canal of another^"•-
controlled by the principles involved in 
exercise of the r ight of eminent domain. ~ s 
S. L . City v. E a s t Jo rdan Irr . Co., 40 TJ. l$js 
121 P . 593. 'Jm 
T h e r ight to us& a reservoir In common
 ; .nlp 
be condemned. A"1'^ 
Gunnison Irr . Co. v. Gunnison High, oa 
Co., 51 U . —; 174 P . 852. ;-&|L 
T h e rlgiht to run water through defeftdanjii 
irrigation canal m a y be condemned, J b . ^ F £ J p i 
defendant has only an easement and the org* 
ers of the l and were not par t ies . ^" .TT 3 *® 
Whi te rocks I r r . Co. v. Mooseman,. 45 Vj'tjjft 
141 P . 459. • J ^ I M -
A purchaser of property on a city street.&&M 
so with the implied consent t h a t the :'£Sf|§L 
m u s t be m a d e reasonably safe and conyen |eg | | 
for t ravel , and cannot complain if i t is :}0Y?qims 
or filled to make it safe for travel BGA?MW 
t he c i ty has established the grade f%:0$M 
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Under the provisions of §§ 7330, 7332, mining 
generally and development of the mines and 
mineral deposits is a public use, and where a 
mining company has driven a tunnel going 
through a claim owned by another company, 
and does not, in its own operation, use the 
tunnel to its full capacity, the company own-
ing the claim may condemn a right to use the 
tunnel jointly to work its claim. 
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con., 50 
XJ. —; 174 P. 172. 
§• 
i n f o r m him of the extent to which it would 
"' be lowered or raised. . 
• Gray v. Salt Lake City, 44 XT. 204; 138 P. 
r1177. 
<" * Coal companies may condemn ground for a 
I tipple site, etc., but cannot condemn any por-
:
. tion of a right-of-way used for railroad pur-
• poses; even though a track departs from a 
:•• right-of-way, it cannot be approached so close 
as to interfere with traffic, and five feet is not 
. an unreasonable minimum distance. 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant "Valley Coal 
Co., 50 XJ. —; 168 P. 86. 
7331. (3589.) Estates and rights subject to comdlemaatioa. The fol-
lowing is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken 
for public use: 
L A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds,' or for per-
manent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned 
thereby;"or for an outlet for a flow,, or a place for the deposit of debris or tail-
ings of a mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores; ^ 
2. An easement, when taken for any other use; 
3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right 'to 
take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may'be neces-
sary for some public use. 
CaL C. Civ. P., § 1239*. 
7332. (3590.) Property subject to condemnation. The private prop-
erty which may be taken under this chapter includes: 
1. All real property belonging to any person; 
2. Lands belonging* to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city 
or town, not appropriated to some public use; 
3. Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property 
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which 
it has been already appropriated; 
4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises*; 
provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways, 
railroads, or other more necessary public use; 
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in § 7330, and 
any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands held or used 
in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or 
intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon; 
they shall also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof, 
when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, and connections 
shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit 
and the least private injury; 
6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for pub-
lic use when such taking is authorized by law. . . 
CaL C. Civ. P., § 1240*. 
Property and franchises of private corpora-
tions subject to eminent domain, Con. art. 12, 
sec. 11. 
Decisions on property subject to condemna-
tion, note to § 7330. 
XJnder the provisions of §§7330, 7332, mining' 
generally and development of the mines, and 
mineral'deposits is a public use, arid where a 
7333. (3591.) Conditions precedent to condemnation. Before property 
can be taken it must appear; 
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
2. That the taking is necessary to such use; 
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to 
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1241. 
7334. (3592.) Right to enter to- make survey, etc. Damage. In all 
cases where land is required for public use, the person or corporation, or his 
or its agents, in charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it * 
must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the great-
est public good and the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of 
mining company has driven a tunnel going 
through a claim owned by another company, 
and does not, in its own operation, use the 
tunnel to its full capacity, the company own-
ing the claim may condemn a right to use the 
tunnel jointly to work its claim. 
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con. 
M.. Co., 50 XT. —; 174 P. 172. 
' 11 
m 
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an action to condemn a railroad's right of way, 
which extends through several counties, for 
construction of its lines in one of such counties. 
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v. O. S\ L. B. B. Co., 
23 U. 474; 65 P . 735. 
this chapter. The person or corporation, or his or its agents, 'in charge of % 
such public use may enter upon the land and make examinations, surveys, and. 'Sfp 
maps thereof, and such entry shall constitute no cause of action in favor of 1§§ 
the owners of the lands, except for injuries resulting from negligence, wan- ^j^ 
tonness, or malice. 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1242*. 
T335. (3593.) Jurisdiction in district coert. Complaiint verified. All 
proceedings under this chapter must be brought in the district court for the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated. The complaint 
in such cases must be verified. 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1243*. 
The provisions of this section are not In con-
flict with Con. art. 8. sec. 5; providing that all 
civil and criminal business arising in any coun-
ty must be tried in such county, etc., so 'as 
to preclude a telegraph company from bringing 
733©. (3594.) Contents of complaint. The complaint must contain: 
1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or person in 
charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled 
plaintiff; 
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a 
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants ; 
. 3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff; • 
4. If a right of way be sought, the complaint must show the location,, 
general route, and termini, and must be accompanied with a map thereof, so 
far as the same is involved in the action or proceeding; 
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether 
the same includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All par-
 : 
eels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included 
in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the 
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Where a complaint fails to state the attempt-
ed condemnation proceedings were authorized, 
as required by statute, the defect, being jur- ' 
isdictional, was not waived by a failure to de-
mur or object during the trial. 
Town of Tremonton v. Johnston, 49 U. 307: 
164 P . 190. 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1244*. 
Parties, note to § 7337. 
Grantors in trust deed to secure indebted-
ness are "owners" hereunder. 
O. S. Xr. By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 U. 505; 21 
P . 893. 
Description of property held sufficient. 
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v. 0 . S. L. E. Co., 23 
IT. 474; 65 P . 735. 
7337. (SSMJ.) AH parties in interest may appear. All persons in occu-
pation of or having or claiming an interest in, any of the property described 
in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named, £p 
may appear, plead, arid defend, each in respect to his own property or in- $ |1 | 
tefest, or that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. ^ 
certificate tax sale may be-
Co. v. Halloct, 41 TJ. 378; i 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1246. 
The giving of a trust deed merely creates a 
lien upon the premises, and a decree against 
the trustee would give no right of entry as 
against the equitable owner. 
O. S. Ii. By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7'U. 505; 27 
P . 693. 
The fact that a telegraph company of an-
other state is interested in a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of Utah to construct 
a telegraph line does not affect the latter's 
right to maintain proceedings to condemn a 
right of way for construction of its lineB. 
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v. O. S. L. B. B. 
Co., 23 U. 474; 65 P . 735. 
I t is not necessary that the complaint in 
condemnation proceedings make all the own-
ers or alleged owners parties; but one in pos-
session and claiming ownership must be joined. 
Brigham City v. Chase, 30 TJ. 410; 85 P . 436. 
A holder of a 
made a party. 
O. S.- It. B. BJ. 
126 P . 394. 
"Where condemnation proceedings are instl-*^^ 
tuted against the person in possession of land.-^-^ 
under contract to purchase from the state ,£*; 
the title to ,which is in the United States Gov-'&Hm 
eminent, subsequently, pending the proceed-^Ag l^p 
ings, the defendant in possession assigned his^r 
right in the land to a corporation, of which 3 ^ 
he was president, which received a patent ;§gg. 
therefor from the state and was afterward^"-^a 
made a party to the proceedings, held the^sgp 
original defendant had an interest in the laJid^ /^^ pf 
when the proceedings were commenced wWch;#|||3 
was subject to condemnation and was the sam'e.^gfe 
interest which passed to the defendant corpo-;^^3 
ration and ripened into a title relating back to/^gg 
the contract sale by the state. : 'Ms 
- - - —• - - - —
 n ?0 .^^ Brigham City v. Bich, 34 U. 130; 97 P . 220. 
J338. (3596.) Power of the co^art. The court or judge thereof shaUj | | 
have power: J ^ f e 
1. To determine the conditions specified in § 7333; to determine t h ? ^ ^ 
places of making connections and crossings, and to regulate the manner t he r e | g 
of and of enjoying the common use mentioned in sub. 5, § 7332; '*' 
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2. To hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the prop-
erty sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor; 
3. To determine the respective rights of different parties seeking con-
demnation of the same property. 
Gal. C. Civ. P., § 1247*. 
Where it is alleged that the defendant com-
pany claimed to own part of the property 
i'7. sought to he condemned, and such company, 
sir * in its answer, claimed title to such land, and 
the plaintiff, in its reply, alleged that, since 
the commencement of the action, it had ac-
. 7339. 
quired title to the land in question and denied 
the defendant's tax title, held the district court 
was authorized to determine these issues in 
the same action. 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 IT. 
342; 159 P . 737. 
(3597.) Occupancy of premises pemdrng actios*. Notice. Hear- %SS J 
ing. Bond Restraining order. The plaintiff may move the court or a judge (jfo 
thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the defend-
ant, if he. is a resident of the county, or has appeared in the action,* otherwise 
by serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the courtjfof an. order 
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, pend-
ing the action, and to do such work thereon as may be required for the ease-
ment sought, according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof shall take 
proof by affidavit or otherwise, of the value of the premises, sought to be con-
demned and of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, and 
of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse 
the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative damages which 
may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court or judge shall 
require the plaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to the defendant, with 
sureties to be approved by the court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by 
the court or judge, not less than double the value of the premises sought to be 
condemned and the damages which will ensue from condemnation, as the 
same may appear to the court or judge on the hearing, and conditioned to 
pay the adjudged value of the premises and all damages in case the property 
is condemned, and to pay all damages arising from occupation before judg-
ment in case the premises are not condemned, and all costs adjudged to the 
defendant in the action. The sureties shall justify before the court or judge 
after a reasonable notice to the defendant of the time and place of justifi-
cation. The amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and 
I?;.- shall not be admissible in evidence' on final hearing. The court or judge may 
also, pending the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or interfering 
vyith the occupation of the premises and the doing thereon of the work re-
quired for the easement. • 
Bight of plaintiS to enter into possession of 
property in condemnation proceeding's, upon 
filing- sufficient bond, upheld, and provisions 
of this section declared not in conflict with 
Con. a r t 1, sec. 22. 
.. S; 1/. C. Water Co. v. S. L . C. et al.f 24 TJ. 2S2; 67 P. 791. 
.;;.•• The mere fact tuat a person contemplates 
having* certain land condemned for public use 
ggjjfc-giveS him no right of entry prior to condemnar 
&f?tioB, and condemnation cannot he had by way jK.of counterclaim in action brought to restrain $g>.a trespass and for damages. 
%jj£.. Peterson v. Bean, 22 TJ. 43; 61 P . 213. 
7340.- (3598.) Bamr»ages, hew assessed. 
That condemnation was for a public use is 
settled by the. lower court's order of condem-
nation authorizing- plaintiff to take possession 
of and improve the land. 
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 TJ. 
342; 159 P . 737. 
A stipulation by a landowner's counsel that 
the court might enter an order ior occupancy, 
agreeing- to the amount of the bond, and stip-
ulating that the road's counsel have time to 
answer, constitutes a- general appearance. 
Ogden L. & I. By. Co., v. Jones, 50 TJ .—; 
168 P . 54B. 
The court, commission-
ermine t h | | 
nner t h e r p g 
D sages. Jta , i n jury, 
Jlers, or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of 
'^#^e parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improve-
ments thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate 
Wtinterest therein; if it consist of different parcels, the value of each parcel 
gJmd of each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed; 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
J l J £ e Parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
Ippdemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be con-
Ifettined, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
l ! f Plaintiff; 
£3. If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by 
^•9nstruction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages; 
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4. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and 
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction 
of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be equal 
to the damages assessed, under sub. 2 of this section, the owner of the parcel *§ 
shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but 
if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be 
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed 
in addition to the value of the portion taken; 
5. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of 
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad between such railroad' 
and .other adjoining lands of the defendant; and the cost of cattle guards 
where fences may cross the line of such railroad; 
6. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source 
of damages separately. 
Cal. CVCiv. P., § 1248*. 
Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation, 
Con. a r t 1, sec. 22. 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR CONDEM-
NATION FOR USE FOR RAILROAD PUR-
POSES: 
Of land used for school, purposes, is the dimi 
nution of the value of the property when used 
for school purposes determined as of the date 
of the operation of the railroad, and interest 
should be avowed from such date. 
S. P.f L. A. & S. JJ.IL Co. v. Board of Edu-
cation, 35 U. 13; 99 P . 263. 
Evidence Insufficient to show that the prop-
erty had been wholly destroyed for school 
purposes. 
S. P., L. A. & S. L. R Co. v. Board of Educa-
tion, 32 TJ. 305; 90 P . 565. 
A railroad In the street In front of property 
—the depreciation in the market value of the 
property. 
Morris v. O. S. L. E. Co., 36 U. 14; 102 P . 
629. 
Where a railroad was built over unoccupied 
public land to which a party afterwards ac-
quires title, the value of the railroad's im-
provements are not an element of damages. 
D. & R. G. W. By. Co. v. Stancliff, 4 IT. 117; 
7 P . 530. 
The castfng of cinders on and the emission 
of engine smoke over land abutting a railroad 
cannot be considered by the jury in a suit hy 
the owner as a separate and distinct element 
of damage. 
Jordan v. Utah R. R. Co., 47 U. 519; 156 
P. 939. 
Where Interference wltth Ingress and egress 
to abutting land, railroad is liable for grading* 
the street in front of the premises. 
Id. 
The rental value of the land to be condemned 
for the year preceding- the one in. which the 
action is commenced is some evidence of value. 
Ogden L. & I . Ry. Co. v. Jones, 50 U. —; 
168 P . 548. 
Increased Insurance rate for property in 
proximity of the railroad. 
O'Neill v, S. P . , L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 
U. 475; 114 P . 127. 
Damages to plaintiff's property by jar of 
passing trains, and from, smoke and cinders, 
where the construction and operation of the 
railroad is careful and proper, but cannot in-
clude damages for negligent operation. 
Id. 
General benefits by the establishment of the 
railroad cannot be deducted from damages to 
owner whose land was taken for right of way. 
S. L. & IT. R. Co. v. Butterfield, 46 TJ. 431; 
150 P . 9'31. 
To compensation In money and may not be 
required to accept any mitigation of damages 
or condemnee's offer of a joint possession or 
occupancy subordinate to the condemnor's use. 
B. & G. Ry. Co. v. North Utah M. Co., 49 
U. 125; 162 P . 65. 
Where a railroad company, on constructing 
a line across a land owner's premises, aband-
oned an old line across the same premises a 
mile distant, the company was not entitled 
to have any benefit from the abandonment of 
the old line set off against the damage done 
the land adjoining the new line. 
O. S. L. R. Co. v. Pox, 28 U. 311; 78 P . 800. 
After defendant, In a former and present 
trial, had submitted all its evidence on the 
theory that condemnor would exclude it from 
the tracks, the condemnor had no right to 
amend, as a matter of course, so as to per-
mit defendant to hava joint possession of the 
part of the track, and an order imposing as a 
condition of the amendment that" condemnor 
pay the defendant $1750 was proper. 
Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co. v. North Utah 
Mining Co., 162 P . 65. • 
COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY TAKEN 
FOR OTHER PUBLIC PURPOSES: 
Where land taken in good faith for the erec-
tion of a schoolhouse, the owner not being 
known, but with intention to acquire title by 
proceedings in eminent domain, if he should 
not consent to such use of it, he cannot re-
cover as damages the value of such school-
house. 
Chase v. Jemmett, 8 U. 231; 30 P . 757. 
Where a telegraph company condemns a ' 
right of way along the right of way for a rail-
road, the damages are nominal, since the tele-
graph company does not materially interfere 
with the use of the land for railroad purposes. 
Postal Tel. Co. v. O. S. L. R. Co., 23 U. 474: 
65 P . 735. 
In* an action for damages to real estate by 
reason of the construction of a viaduct, where 
witness testified as to the depreciation, of the 
property, evidence that the viaduct tended to 
improve the property generally • on the street, 
and made more business thereon, is not admis-
sible, where it is not shown that the particu-
lar property is benefited. 
Cook v. Salt Lake City, 48 U. 5S; 157 P. 
643. 
In proceedings to condemn a strip of land , 
on which to erect poles bearing wires heavily 
charged with electricity, if the presence of 
the wires would expose persons and livestock-
on the land of defendant to danger, and thus 
depreciate the market value of such land, de- • 
fendant was entitled to show such fact 
Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 41 U. 501; 
125 P. 399. 
In an action to condemn land for canal pur-
poses, the damages recoverable by land owner < 
may include damages by seepage to adjoining 
land and for the land within the highway to • 
which the plaintiff owned the fee. 
Utah Lake Irr. Co. v. Jensen, 49 U. 19; 161 . 
P. 677. • 
Eliciting from the owner on cross-exam In a- • 
tlon that fifteen years prior he had stated the f 
value much less than he testified their value..,:ii 
to be a t the trial was improper, as being too^gp 
remote, but harmless as to substantial rights. :jr" 
Town' of Tremonton v. Johnston, 49 U. 307;-^ 
164 P. 190. • ?%l 
Where property such as a mining tunnel is'£$$ 
condemned for the- purpose of a joint use, the; " 
whole matter of determining what is a reason-iyc_,. 
able compensation as well as the regulations a$pgj 
respecting the use of the property is deter-^Jgf^ 
mined and regulated according to the rules oZ$M 
equity. " .^r7^ 
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con>M 
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7341. (3599.) Damages deemed accrued at date of service. For the 
Stirpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be 
ffleemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual 
jfealue at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be 
factually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but 
^injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided 
fen the next preceding section. No improvements put upon the property sub-
g*sequent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the assessment 
jl^ bf compensation or damages. 
Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1249*. 
Where condemnation su i t is brought agains t 
- J ? ' trustee under a t r u s t deed, and summons 
i i&' /served upon him, and t h e equitable owner 
rar®/' thereafter voluntari ly en te rs his appearance, 
^ ^ f l a m a g e s a r e to be assessed a s of the da te of 
s&such en t ry of appearance , no t the da te of 
^'.service of summons upon t rus tee . 
£ O. S. L . By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 TJ. 505; 27 
§&'P. 693. 
Under provisions of th i s section and §§ 7343-
7346, defendants in a condemnation proceeding' 
were not enti t led to in teres t upon the assess-
m e n t of compensat ion from the date of the 
service of s u m m o n s ; defendants remaining in 
possession. 
O. S. L . H. K. Co. v. Jones, 29 TJ. 147; 80 P . 
732. 
S. L . City W a t e r Co. v. S. L . City, 24 TJ. 282; 
67 P . 791. 
-m 
J] Con. 
7342. (3600.) Action begun anew where defendant's title defective. If 
J P the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause, the 
p | \ plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same as in this chapter 
*'
:
 prescribed. ' . . 
.• Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1250. 
7343. (3601.) Damages to he paid within thirty days. Bond for rail-
road fence. The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay 
the sum of money assessed; and, if the plaintiff is a railroad company, it shall 
• also execute to the defendant a bqnd, with sureties, to be determined and ap-
proved by the court or judge, conditioned that the plaintiff shall build proper 
fences within six months from the time the railroad is built on or over the 
land taken. In an action on the bond, all damages sustained and the cost of 
the construction of such fences may be recovered. 
'Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1251*. 
7344. (3602.) Id. To whom paid. Execution if not paid. Annulling 
proceedings. Payment may be made to the defendants entitled thereto, or 
the money may be deposited in court for the defendants and be distributed 
to those entitled thereto. If the money be not so paid or deposited, the de-
fendants may have execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be 
made on execution, the court, upon a showing to that effect, must set aside 
. and annul the entire proceedings, and restore possession of the property to 
the defendants if possession has been taken by the plaintiff. 
Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1252. 
7345. (3603.) Final order made inpon payment. Recording same. 
-When payments have been made (and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects 
to give one), as required by the next two preceding sections, the court must 
make a final order of condemnation, which must describe the property con-
demned and the purpose of such condemnation. A copy of the order must be 
filed in the office of the recorder of the county, and thereupon the property 
described therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose therein specified. 
Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1253. • ' 
7346. (3604.) Authorising occupancy by plaintiff. Deposit. Payment. 
Effect. At any time after-the entry of judgment, or pending an appeal from 
the judgment to the supreme court, whenever the plaintiff shall have paid 
• into court for the defendant the full amount of the judgment, and such further 
sum as^  may be required by the court as a fund to pay any further damages 
' and -ca^fe-tliat may be recovered in said proceedings'^ as well as all damages 
that may be sustained by the defendant, if for any cause the property shall 
not be finally taken for public use, the district court in which the proceeding 
was tried may, upon notice of not less than ten days, authorize the plaintiff, 
if already in possession, to continue therein, and if not, then to take posses-
;. sion of and use the property during the pendency of and until the final con-
clusion of the litigation, and may, if necessary, stay all actions and proceed-. 
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to the money paid into court for him upon any judgment, shall be entitled to\t§l§| 
demand and receive the same at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order.tjSf 
therefor from the court. It shall be the duty of the court or a judge thereof T 
upon application being made by such defendant, to order and direct that the * 
money so paid into court for him be delivered to him upon his filing a satis-*: 
faction of the judgment, or upon his filing a receipt therefor, and an abandon-1 
ment of all defenses to the action or proceeding, except as to the amount of: 
damages .that he may be entitled to in the &Ytut that a new trial shall be; 
granted A payment to a defendant, as aforesaid, shall be held to be an •' 
abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by him, excepting.': 
his claim for greater compensation; • • •; 
Gal. C. Civ. P. , § 1254*. , • ' ; 
7347. (3605.) Apportionment of costs. Costs may be allowed or not /H 
and if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or ad- "" 
verse sides, in the discretion of the court. •: 
Cal. C. Civ. P. , § 1255. This section Includes only such costs as a r e ' ? P 
Costs Generally, §§ 7035-7054. • . t axable under t h e s t a tu te . ,t$f 
McCready v. R- G. W. By. Co., 30 17. 1: 83 '%M 
P . 331. . g 
7348- (3606.) Procedure applicable. Except as otherwise provided in l i p 
this chapter, the provisions of this code relative jto civil actions, new trials, W§ 
and appeals shall be applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the | | l ! 
proceedings in this chapter. 3^8 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1256*. 
7349. (3607.) Rights of cities and towns' not affected. Nothing in this; 
code must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute providing for thejf§ 
taking of property in any city or town for street purposes. M , 
Cal. a Civ. P., § 1263. *Jj|l 
7350. (3608.) Crossings to be made and' kept in repair. A party ob-iiiSF 
taining a right of way shall, without delay, construct such crossings as may J i t 
be required by the court or judge, and shall keep them and the way itself in^jf-
good repair. -VSI 
CHAPTER 66. 
QUO WARRANTO. 
7354. (3609.) Actioni in name of state, against wno-m. A civil action! 
may be brought in the name of the state: 
1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or |p 
exercises^a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, within this state. of|f| 
an office in a corporation^created by the authority of this state; '*""* 
2. Against a public officer, civil or military, who does or suffers an acfif 
which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office; .$&' 
3. Against an association of persons who act as a corporation withing 
this state without being legally incorporated. ' " 
Mont. Civ. P . , § 1410. 
Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 803*. 
Original jur isdict ion in supreme and in d i s -
t r i c t courts, Con. art* 8, sees. 4, 7. 
The w r i t of quo w a r r a n t o will no t issue a n d 
cannot be invoked for purpose of determining-
merely a p r iva te r igh t in which the public is 
no t interested. 
Cupit v. Parte City Bank, 20 TJ. 292; 58 P . 
839. 
The a t to rney-gen era! m u s t bring- the ac t ion 
in the n a m e of the s t a t e on his own re la t ion 
or on leave of court on relat ion of another , : -^_ 
except tha t one claiming to be entitled to p u b s $ g | | 
lie office unlawfully exercised by another mays-gT^3 
bring action i n the name of t h e s ta te ; u n d e r , ^ 
such c i rcumstances he alone m a y control thejL 
action. "^ a?®5 
Murdoch T. Ryan, 41 IT. 327; 125' P. 666. tyg 
A citizen a n d resident t axpaye r cannot s u f ? | | | 
in t he n a m e of the s t a t e to t e s t validity of thai 
organization of a high school district; ti?B3 
s t a t e alone m a y do so. 
Id. 
7355. (3610.) Id. Agaiost a corporation. A like action may 
brought against a corporation: • ^%m 
1. When it has offended against a provision of an act by or under wHi£^ 
.it was created, altered, or renewed, or any act altering or amending s u c^.-; i |^8 
2. When it has forfeited its privileges and franchises by n o n u s e f ^ ^ ^ J 
• • • • .$&$ 
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